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CRIMINAL LAW - PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO THE OBJECTIVE TEST 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the fourth amendment, I every citizen has the right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is jeopard­
ized when law enforcement officers use a pretextual arrest as an excuse 
for carrying out a search that is otherwise illegal. For the purpose of 
this note, a pretextual arrest will be defined as a legal arrest carried out 
for an illegal purpose.2 A "classic example ... occurs when an officer 
stops a driver for a minor traffic violation in order to investigate a 
hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal" activity.3 A pretextual 
arrest presents a unique threat to those rights guaranteed by the fourth 
amendment because, as one judge observed, pretextual arrests trans­
form a common traffic ticket into a "one-time pass" to violate the 
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause.4 
Traditionally, courts have responded to pretextual arrests by in­
voking the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is designed to al­
low judges to suppress evidence from arrests that violate the 
1. The fourth amendment of the Constitution provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War­

rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. See Burkhoff, Pretext Searches, 19 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. no.4 at 25 
(1982); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) ("A pretextual stop 
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person 
or place ... for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop."). 
3. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515. 
4. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1186 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J., 
concurring). See also United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (A 
pretextual arrest "serves as a means to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. "). 
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constitution.5 In order to determine if a given arrest is unconstitu­
tional, the courts currently use an objective test that examines only the 
conduct of the arresting officers.6 If the officers' actions, viewed with­
out regard for their sUbjective intent, are found to be unreasonable, the 
exclusionary rule may be applied to block admission of the evidence. 
Motive is not a factor in the objective test, for, as one court put it, "an 
objectively reasonable seizure does not violate the Constitution despite 
the officer's bad intent."7 
The objective test provides an effective method of identifying non­
pretextual arrests that violate the fourth amendment. The test, how­
ever, fails to identify pretextual arrests because the test ignores the 
motives of the arresting officers, and, with pretextual arrests, it is the 
motives of the officers, not their conduct, which are illegal. 8 The pur­
pose of this note is to examine the weaknesses inherent in the objective 
test and to propose a modification of the test that addresses these 
weaknesses. This new test has two steps. The first preserves the cur­
rent objective standard in order to address non-pretextual arrests. The 
second step involves a separate balancing test which weighs the bene­
fits of admitting potentially important evidence against the costs to the 
integrity of the judicial system of tolerating improper law enforcement 
behavior.9 
Part I of this note traces the development of the objective test, 
showing how the Supreme Court originally used a subjective test in 
United States v. Lefkowitz 10 and why this test was eventually replaced 
by the objective test in Scott v. United States. ll Part II focuses on a 
single case, United States v. Causey,12 which serves as an example of 
two different ways in which the objective test has been applied in the 
5. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976). 
6. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978). 
7. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987). 
8. The objective test upholds any arrest which has an objectively valid basis. By 
definition, a pretextual arrest is a valid arrest for an invalid reason. Therefore, by defini­
tion, all pretextual arrests will pass the objective test. See infra note 44 and accompanying 
text. 
9. This second step is based on an alternative rationale for the exclusionary rule. The 
primary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Preserving the 
integrity of the judicial system is a secondary rationale. The first step of the proposed test 
is based on deterrence in order to discourage illegal conduct. The second step is based on 
the judicial integrity rationale and seeks to protect the legal system as a whole from the 
effects of police misconduct. See infra notes 177-191 and accompanying text. 
10. 285 U.S. 452, 463-67 (1932). See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Lefkowitz. 
II. 436 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978). See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Scott. 
12. 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987)·(en banc). 
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context of pretextual arrests. Part III analyzes alternative tests ad­
vanced by Professors Wayne LaFave and John Burkhotf. This note 
applies these alternative standards to the facts of Causey in order to 
measure their effectiveness in identifying pretextual arrests. Lastly, 
this note presents a new approach and explains why it offers an im­
proved standard by which to test pretextual arrests. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR IDENTIFYING 
PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS 
A. The Subjective Standard 
Prior to 1978, courts generally used a subjective standard to iden­
tify pretextual arrests. 13 This standard focused on police intent. A 
court using the sUbjective standard would examine the factual circum­
stances of a case and attempt to determine the arresting officers' mo­
tives. If the court concluded that law enforcement officers acted with 
an illegal motive, the court would find the arrest pretextual and there­
fore illegal. The exclusionary rule would be invoked to suppress the 
evidence. 14 
The earliest example of the older SUbjective standard is United 
States v. Lefkowitz. ls While Lefkowitz did not involve a pretextual 
arrest as defined in this note, the Supreme Court did state that "[a]n 
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence," and this 
statement has frequently been cited in pretextual arrest cases. 16 A 
more detailed explanation of the Supreme Court's pre-Scott position, 
however, appears in Abel v. United StatesP In Abel, the defendant 
claimed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had arranged 
for the Immigration Service to carry out an administrative arrest so 
13. See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970); Amador-Gonza­
lez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1968); Massachusetts v. Painten, 368 F.2d 
142, 143-44 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 931 (1967), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 560 
(1968); United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 874-76 (M.D. Fla. 1971). 
14. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion 
of Taglavore, see infra notes 20-26. 
15. 285 U.S. 452, 463-67 (1932). In Lefkowitz, law enforcement officers arrested the 
defendant under a valid warrant. The federal agents went beyond the scope of the issued 
warrant and carried out a general exploratory search for evidence. Id. at 458. The Court 
found that the search was done outside of the agents' proper authority. Id. at 463-67. 
Courts have cited Lefkowitz as authority for excluding evidence obtained through a pretex­
tual arrest. See, e.g., Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D. Ariz. 1971). 
16. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 467. 
17. 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). See Burkhoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
70 (1982); I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e), at 90-97 (1987); Burkhoff, Pre­
text Searches, supra note 2, at 25. 
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that the FBI could search for evidence pertaining to a different matter. 
In dicta the Court stated: 
The deliberate use by the Government of an administrative warrant 
for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet 
stern resistance by the courts. The preliminary stages of a criminal 
prosecution must be pursued in strict obedience to the safeguards 
and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. IS 
In line with the Supreme Court's statements in Lefkowitz and 
Abel, lower courts adopted the subjective test. 19 A specific example of 
the subjective test can be seen in a Ninth Circuit case, Taglavare v. 
United States. 20 
In Taglavare, vice squad officers, suspecting a man of possessing 
marijuana,21 obtained warrants relating to two prior traffic violations. 
The officers waited until they believed that the defendant had drugs in 
his possession.22 Then, while serving the warrants, they saw the de­
fendant put something into his mouth. The officers threw the defend­
ant down, and one sat on his stomach while the other choked the 
defendant and pulled the remains of a marijuana cigarette out of his 
mouth.23 
The court held that the evidence was inadmissible. From the 
facts of the case, the court inferred that the police had "engaged in a 
deliberate scheme to evade the requirements of the Fourth Amend­
ment."24 The court stated that "[w]here the arrest is only a sham or a 
front being used as an excuse for making a search, the arrest itself and 
the ensuing search are illegal. "25 The court explained the reason be­
hind its decision, saying: "Were the use of misdemeanor arrest war­
rants as a pretext for searching people suspected of felonies to be 
permitted, a mockery could be made of the Fourth Amendment and 
its guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to ... prevent such a mis­
use of legal processes. "26 
The sUbjective test, however, has been criticized for two reasons: 
18. Abel, 362 U.S. at 226. 
19. Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308,315 (5th Cir. 1968); Blazak v. 
Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D. Ariz. 1971); United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 
871,874-76 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1975). 
20. 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). 
21. Id. at 264. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 267. 
25. /d. at 265. 
26. Id. at 266. 
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first, motives are often difficult to ascertain,27 and second, the fourth 
amendment proscribes only unreasonable conduct, not unreasonable 
motives. Based largely on the latter reason, the Supreme Court aban­
doned the sUbjective approach in Scott v. United States. 28 
B. The Objective Standard 
In 1978, in Scott v. United States, the Supreme Court established 
the objective standard, which switched the primary focus from intent 
to conduct. While the Scott case did not involve a pretextual arrest, its 
holding has set the standard for determining when an arrest violates 
the fourth amendment. 29 
In Scott, the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained a warrant 
to tap the phone lines of suspected drug dealers.30 As required by the 
federal wiretapping statute,3l the warrant required the FBI "to mini­
mize the interception of communications that are [not] otherwise sub­
ject to interception."32 The agents were aware of the statute's 
requirements, "but made no attempt to comply therewith," and taped 
all the defendants' telephone calls.33 The defendants moved to have 
the tapes excluded because the agents had knowingly violated the re­
strictions imposed by the warrant. 34 
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist, 
stated that the constitutionality of fourth amendment activity should 
be judged objectively. The Court noted that, "almost without excep­
27. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 2\0,463 A.2d 320 (1983), cerro denied, 465 U.S. \030 
(1984). The Bruzzese court stated: 
We believe that it places an unfair burden on law enforcement authorities. Delv­
ing into the so-called ulterior motives of policemen penalizes officers who out­
wardly behave in a constitutionally appropriate way .... [A] defendant ... may 
receive a windfall because the searching police officer harbored bad thoughts, de­
spite the fact that those thoughts did not alter the external effects of the officer's 
action. 
Id. at 222, 463 A.2d at 327. The Bruzzese court also criticized the subjective test for being 
unpredictable, noting that motives are often difficult to identify and that each court may 
have different views of what constitutes the arresting officer's "true" intentions. Id. at 221, 
463 A.2d at 326. 
28. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
29. Lester V. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, \08 S. Ct. 355 (1987); United States 
V. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States V. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 
(1st Cir. 1980); State v. Malik, 201 N.J. Super. 114, 119-20,534 A.2d 27, 29 (1987). 




32. Id. at 131-32. 
33. Id. at 133. Forty percent of the calls were related to narcotics deals. Id. at 132. 
34. Id. 
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tion," previous opinions dealing with fourth amendment violations 
were based on an "objective" standard. The Court observed that the 
courts of appeals had "generally followed these principles, first exam­
ining [the arrest] ... under a standard of objective reasonableness 
without regard to the underlying intent or motivation."35 Based on 
this interpretation of precedent, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the 
determination of violations of the fourth amendment "turns on an ob­
jective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and cir­
cumstances confronting him at the time. "36 
The Court believed that the sUbjective test should be discarded 
because the intent of the arresting officers is constitutionally irrelevant. 
Justice Rehnquist explained that "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does 
not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional;"37 he 
also wrote, "[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind 
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justifica­
tion for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long 
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."38 In 
Scott, therefore, the Court rejected the sUbjective test and ruled that 
the actions of law enforcement officers should be examined objectively 
because the motives of the police officers have no bearing on the con­
stitutionality of their acts.39 
Following Scott, the Supreme Court has continued to use an ob­
35. Scott, 436 u.s. at 137-38. This characterization of the holdings of Supreme 
Court and courts of appeals decisions is at best questionable. See Note, Addressing the 
Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amend­
ment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 242-46 (1983); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § l.4(e), 
at 90-91; Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 74. Professor Burkhoff refers to the objective standard 
as "mere dicta." Id. Professor Burkhoff argues that the cases used by the Scott Court do 
not provide any support for Justice Rehnquist's statement. Id. 
36. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 138. 
39. Lower courts have adhered to this rationale. See, e.g., Lester v. Chicago, 830 
F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987) 
("As Scott' plainly states, the unchallenged premises that the deputies had probable cause to 
and could lawfully arrest Basey ... render irrelevant any inquiry into the deputies' above­
referenced alleged ulterior motivation."); People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 
523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that when of­
ficers do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their 
motives in doing so are irrelevant and not subject to inquiry, and the results of their investi­
gations are not to be suppressed."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1935 (1989); State v. Petty, 48 
Wash. App. Ct. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (1987) ("[T]he constitutionality of the officer's 
action is not undermined by the officer's reasons for approaching the house. An officer's 
underlying intent or motivation is irrelevant to the judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of 
the officer's conduct. "). 
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jective standard in ruling on the constitutionality of arrests.40 For ex­
ample, in Maryland v. Macon,41 the defendant claimed that because an 
undercover officer purchased obscene materials with the intent to use 
them as evidence, the purchase was in fact a warrantless seizure.42 
Citing Scott, the Supreme Court said that the proper test is an objec­
tive assessment of conduct, not "the officer's actual state of mind. "43 
As a result, when called upon to decide the constitutionality of 
allegedly pretextual arrests, most lower courts have employed the 
Scott objective test.44 "[C]ourts do not agree, however, on what objec­
tive elements are dispositive in determining whether a pretextual intru­
sion is unconstitutional."45 For example, the majority of courts follow 
the test strictly and ignore the arresting officer's motives.46 This note 
will refer to this approach as the "strict objective" standard. Other 
courts, however, overtly adopt the objective test, but actually use the 
objective facts of the arrest as a means of determining the subjective 
intent of the police.47 This alternate method, referred to in this note as 
40. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983). 
41. 472 U.S. 463 (1985). 
42. Id. at 470-71. 
43. Id. at 470. 
44. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d. Cir.), em. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); United States 
v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 
(1st Cir. 1980); State v. Malik, 221 N.J. Super. 114, 120, 534 A.2d 27, 29 (1987). In some 
instances, courts have ignored Scott and used the subjective test. In United States v. Keller, 
499 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. III. 1980), an officer stopped a car for having only one license plate 
because, in the officer's words, "many times a traffic violation does lead to bigger things." 
[d. at 416. The Keller court, without citing Scott, rejected the contention "that ordinarily 
an arrest is judged by 'an objective standard rather than by inquiring into the officer's 
presumed motives.''' [d. at 417 (citation omitted). The Keller court refused to use the 
objective test because such a test would uphold all pretextual arrests. By definition, a 
pretextual arrest involves two different charges, the one the police are really interested in 
and the minor charge used as a pretext. If this minor charge is legal, a court using the 
objective test will find that the minor charge, no matter how trivial, satisfies the objective 
test. 
The court stated that "the [objective test] ... virtually eliminates the possibility of ever 
proving a pretextual arrest. If every arrest were judged by an objective standard and up­
held if there was a valid basis for arrest, then there could never be a pretextual arrest." Id. 
The Keller court noted that an objective approach "rewards the officer for his subterfuge; 
his pretextual stop successfully uncovers other incriminating conduct or evidence and then 
the government is permitted to use that evidence." Id. 
45. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, ISIS (10th Cir. 1988). 
46. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985); United States v. Basey, 816 
F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 (1st Cir. 1980); 
State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 495-96, 595 P.2d 1364, 1370 (I979). 
47. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 756 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988), cerro denied, 109 S. Ct. 1137 (1989); United 
States V. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316-17, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); 
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the "modified objective" approach, appears in many ways to be the old 
sUbjective test applied within the restrictions of the language of the 
Scott decision.48 Regardless of the test used, if an arrest is determined 
to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule is invoked.49 The recent 
case of United States v. Causey 50 demonstrates the two different ways 
the objective test has been applied. 
II. UNITED STATES V. CAUSEY 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two decisions in the 
Causey case. The first, Causey 1,51 was a unanimous three judge panel 
decision. The second, Causey II,52 vacated Causey I following a re­
hearing en banco Causey I, without dissent, applied the modified ob­
jective standard. The Causey II majority used the strict objective 
standard. 
The facts of Causey were undisputed. Baton Rouge police re­
ceived a tip that Reginald Causey had been involved in a bank rob­
bery.53 Causey fit a description given by a bank teller. Additionally, 
Causey had a record of prior bank robberies. The police realized that 
their informant's tip was insufficient to establish probable cause for an 
arrest, but they still wished to question Causey. 54 The officers checked 
the city warrant book and found a seven-year-old default warrant for 
failing to appear on a misdemeanor theft charge. While the statute of 
limitations barring prosecution for the theft had passed, the statute of 
limitations on the default warrant for failing to appear had not. After 
a judge determined that the default warrant was still valid, the police 
arrested Causey, read him his Miranda rights, and took him to the 
station. There, they read him his rights again and questioned him. 55 
According to Causey's testimony, the police informed him that, if 
he were brought up before a state court, he might face not only the 
United States v. Johnson, 815 F.2d 309,315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032 
(1988). 
48. See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (When analyzing a possible 
pretextual arrest, the appropriate inquiry is whether "a reasonable officer would not have 
made the arrest absent illegitimate motive. "). 
49. Note that the strict objective and modified objective tests are simply standards 
used to evaluate whether an arrest is unconstitutional. If found unconstitutional, the exclu­
sionary rule may be applied. See United States V. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 
1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting). 
50. 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.), rev'd. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
51. Id. 
52. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). 
53. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 355. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 356. 
113 1990] PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
robbery charge, but also separate charges under the state Habitual 
Criminal Act. However, if he were to confess to the FBI and stand 
trial on federal robbery charges only, his sentence might potentially be 
shorter.56 Causey agreed to confess. The police called in the FBI who 
asked Causey whether the police had threatened or promised him any­
thing. Causey answered that the police had not threatened him, and 
he confessed to the robbery.57 He was tried and convicted. Causey 
appealed, claiming the arrest was an illegal pretext because at trial the 
police testified that their only reason for arresting Causey was "to con­
tinue the investigation of the bank robbery."58 A three' judge panel of 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his conviction. On rehear­
ing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled 
and vacated the earlier panel decision. 59 
A. Causey I 
In Causey I, Judge Rubin, writing for a unanimous three judge 
panel, found that Causey's arrest was a pretext and that evidence ob­
tained as a result of it could be suppressed.60 Judge Rubin identified 
the issue before the court as whether a suspect's confession is admissi­
ble when an officer arrests a suspect with a valid warrant, but with the 
intent of interrogating the suspect for a different crime.61 
Judge Rubin acknowledged that Scott provided the proper stan­
dard for resolving questions of pretextual arrests.62 However, Judge 
Rubin found that the arrest in Causey failed to pass the Scott objective 
test because the arresting officers had no objectively valid reason to 
arrest Causey on the default warrant. Judge Rubin cited United States 
v. Basey 63 and United States v. Johnson,64 two cases in which the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had previously applied the Scott test. Judge 
Rubin found that in both, the facts indicated that the arrests were 
objectively valid. For example, Judge Rubin was satisfied with the evi­
dence that the police had acted in "good faith" in Basey; he concluded 
that the law enforcement officers had acted within their "legitimate 
interests" in Johnson. 65 Therefore, according to Judge Rubin, the ar­
56. /d. 
57. Id. at 357. 
58. Id. 
59. Causey 11,834 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
60. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 355. 
61. /d. at 358. 
62. Id. 
63. 816 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1987). 
64. 815 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032 (1988). 
65. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 358. The Basey court held that the defendant's focus "on 
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rests in Basey and Johnson were not pretextual. 
In contrast with Basey and Johnson, Judge Rubin found that the 
arrest in Causey must have been pretextual because there was no in­
dependent basis for the investigation absent the warrant which was 
issued for another charge.66 He noted that "the objective facts and 
circumstances would not have justified any officer in making the 
arrest."67 Citing Lejkowitz 68 and Taglavore 69 as support, he con­
cluded that, if the police "detain a suspect as a pretext to conduct a 
search for which probable cause is lacking ... the subsequent search is 
unconstitutional."70 
The prosecutor argued that cases such as Lejkowitz and Taglavore 
could be distinguished because these cases involved fourth amendment 
searches and not fifth amendment confessions as in Causey.71 Judge 
Rubin dismissed this argument as a "distinction without a differ­
ence."72 Judge Rubin concluded that "[t]he degree of intrusiveness of 
an arrest made as a pretext to question is not less than the degree of 
intrusiveness of an arrest made as a pretext to search. "73 
Judge Rubin then examined two contradictory Fifth Circuit 
cases, Amador-Gonzalez v. United States 74 and United States v. Caval­
lino.75 In Amador-Gonzalez, a narcotics officer noticed the defendant 
acting suspiciously near a car belonging to known drug dealers.76 The 
officer followed the defendant and observed a few minor traffic viola­
tions. The police stopped the defendant, and a search uncovered her-
the officers' motive for the arrest misperceives the proper issue;" it then cited Scott in sup­
port of a purely objective test considering only the officer's conduct. United States v. Ba­
sey, 816 F.2d 980,990 (5th Cir. 1987). The Johnson court, on the other hand, advanced an 
approach that would examine police motive. "If a reasonable officer would not have made 
the arrest absent illegitimate motive, then the resulting search ... is unlawful." Johnson, 
815 F.2d at 315 (5th Cir. 1987). 
66. 818 F.2d at 358. 
67. Id. at 359. 
68. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). For a discussion of Lefkowitz, 
see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
69. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of 
Taglavore, see supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
70. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 359. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 360. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (holding 
that the exclusionary rule applies equally to evidence from confessions and physical evi­
dence). Id. at 485-88. 
74. 391 F.2d 308, 316 (5th Cir. 1968). Amador-Gonzalez has been relied on by other 
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
75. 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974). 
76. Amador-Gonzalez, 391 F.2d at 310. 
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oin. The defendant confessed to the charged drug offenses.77 The 
Amador-Gonzalez court concluded that the arrest was pretextual be­
cause the officer searched the car for drugs even though the arrest was 
technically for a traffic violation. 78 Cavallino was factually similar, 
but reached an opposite result. 79 In Cavallino, the police chief ordered 
two officers to follow a suspect and arrest him when he violated any 
traffic ordinance. The officers did so, and the defendant eventually 
confessed to an unrelated offense. 8o The court stated that the motives 
of the officers were unimportant and upheld the constitutionality of 
the confession because the officers had an objectively valid reason for 
making the traffic arrest.81 
Judge Rubin expressed his concern that admitting evidence from 
pretextual searches would encourage violations of fourth amendment 
rights. He observed that Cavallino could be construed as suggesting 
that police can use any excuse to arrest a person: 
Cavallino permits the police intentionally to conjure up some pre­
text to arrest a person and to use that arrest to conduct an interro­
gation that the fourth amendment would otherwise prohibit. The 
holding thus unintentionally encourages the development of police­
state processes, whereby overzealous officers are permitted to ex­
ploit any possible violation of some misdemeanor statute in order to 
incarcerate citizens without regard for the individual's freedom. 82 
Judge Rubin found that Amador-Gonzalez furnished the correct 
standard because it prevented any use of evidence seized from a 
pretextual arrest. Concluding that Cavallino was an aberration,83 
Judge Rubin determined that the decision of the Amador-Gonzalez 
court was more consistent with both Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent.84 
Judge Rubin held that, in light of Amador-Gonzalez, the arrest of 
Reginald Causey was a pretext and that evidence obtained as a result 
of the arrest was subject to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary 
rule, however, does not autoJ?atically require the suppression of all 
77. Id. at 310-11. 
78. Id. at 315. 
79. 498 F.2d 1200, 1201-03 (5th Cir. 1974). 
80. Id. at 1201-03. 
81. Id. 
82. United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 360 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
83. Id. at 361. 
84. Id. at 360-61. 
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illegal evidence.85 With confessions, the accepted procedure is to eval­
uate the evidence under the four point test of Brown v. Illinois 86 to 
determine if the Miranda warnings attenuate the taint that results 
from the illegal arrest.87 Judge Rubin found that, in Causey, there 
were no intervening events that broke the causal chain from arrest to 
confession. Furthermore, he held that the law enforcement officers' 
actions were a deliberate attempt to circumvent constitutional protec­
tions and were "a 'flagrantly abusive' violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. "88 As a result, the confession was inadmissible. He concluded 
that "[t]he police deliberately set out to interrogate [Causey] by em­
ploying a method that violated his constitutional rights. The evidence 
thus obtained is as tainted as if it had been obtained by coercion, bru­
tality, or any other unconstitutionallever."89 
B. Causey fL· The Strict Objective Standard 
The en banc circuit court in Causey II vacated the panel's deci­
sion in Causey I. The en banc court found that, objectively, the con­
duct of the police was not a violation of Causey's constitutional rights 
and that, after Scott, it was inappropriate to examine an arresting of­
ficer's intentions.90 Judge Gee noted that the reason for the rehearing 
en banc was to resolve a possible conflict between Scott and the Causey 
I court's holding "that conduct otherwise lawful in every respect on 
the part of the police is rendered unconstitutional by their irregular 
subjective intent alone."91 Judge Gee also criticized Causey I for ad­
ding a new requirement to the analysis for determining a confession's 
admissibility. Previously, the admission of confessions had been con­
trolled by the constitutional voluntariness standard and the Supreme 
Court's Miranda requirements.92 In addition to these limitations, ac­
cording to Judge Gee, the Causey I "panel added an additional re­
quirement that the police who took the confessor lawfully into custody 
85. Id. 
86. 422 u.s. 590, 610 (1975). 
87. Id. Meeting the Miranda requirements does not in itself result in admission of a 
confession obtained from an illegal arrest. Four criteria have to be met in order to remove 
the "taint" caused by the arrest. These include voluntariness, the time lag between the 
arrest and confession, any intervening events, and the degree of official misconduct. Id. at 
603-04. 
88. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 361-62 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 
(1975». 
89. Id. at 362-63. 
90. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1182-85. 
91. Id. at 1180. 
92. Id. 
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must not have done so with improper motive. "93 
Judge Gee's opinion stressed that the police conduct in the Causey 
case was lawful. It was only the intentions of the arresting officers that 
caused the panel court to declare the arrest illegal.94 Judge Gee took 
issue with the panel's use of authority, particularly Amador-Gonza­
lez.95 In a footnote, he pointed out that the opinion of the Amador
Gonzalez court, that Judge Rubin cited as support for his position in 
Causey 1,96 was not endorsed by the full panel in Amador-Gonzalez.97 
Additionally, according to Judge Gee, the Amador-Gonzalez majority 
qualified its decision saying: 
The pretextual motivation did not vitiate the validity of the 
arrest. ... Proof that a traffic arrest was only a pretext to search for 
evidence of another offense is significant legally only because it bears 
on the reasonableness of the search ... the emphasis is on the objec­
tive relationship between the nature of the offense and the nature 
(circumstances) of the search, rather than on the motivational cause 
of the arrest.98 
Judge Gee concluded that, under Amador-Gonzalez, the focus of judi­
cial inquiry is not on the motives of the officers but on the objective 
reasonableness of the search. Citing Scott, he stated: 
Again and again, in precisely the present context, the Court has told 
us that where the police officers are objectively doing what they are 
legally authorized to do-as in arresting Causey ... their investiga­
tions are not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective 
intent with which they acted.99 
Judge Gee held that Causey's confession was admissible, observing 
that Causey had been repeatedly read his Miranda rights and that this 
procedure indicated the objective reasonableness of the arresting of­
ficers' actions.lOo Judge Gee concluded that, as long as the actions of 
the law enforcement officers were lawful, their motivations were of 
"no consequence."l0l 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1181. 
95. Id. at 1181-82. 
96. In Causey I, 818 F.2d at 361, Judge Rubin stated that Amador-Gonzalez held 
"pretext arrests unconstitutional." Id. at 1182 n.6. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (quoting Amador-Gonzalez, 391 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis ad­




10I. Id. at 1185. 
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Judge Higginbotham concurred in the use of the objective test, 
but emphasized two separate points. First, he pointed out that there 
was no evidence that the police had stored or "warehoused" the war­
rant for use in later arrests. 102 Judge Higginbotham was concerned 
that, if this had been the case, old warrants would be used "to pocket a 
one-time pass to the strictures of the fourth amendment."103 He 
warned that the court's holding was not to be construed as tolerating 
storing of old warrants for this purpose. 104 
Second, Judge Higginbotham stressed that the warrant was vali­
dated by a magistrate. According to Judge Higginbotham, a warrant 
is presumed to be reasonable if it is issued by a neutral magistrate on 
sufficient probable cause.105 He noted that the fact that "the police 
may have been motivated to execute the warrant for reasons extrinsic 
to the offense ordinarily is irrelevant so long as there is probable cause 
for the arrest."106 Because the judge issued the warrant on sufficient 
probable cause, the warrant was presumed to be within the "circle of 
objective reasonableness."107 This presumption of reasonableness can 
only be overcome by objective evidence to the contrary, which Judge 
Higginbotham believed was lacking. 108 
Six judges joined in Judge Rubin's dissent in Causey II. The dis­
102. Id. 




107. Id. The presence of a judge in the warrant process raises important questions. 
Arguably, if a judge issues a warrant, it is improper to apply the exclusionary rule to subse­
quent acts of law enforcement officers. The primary justification for excluding evidence is 
deterrence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The deterrence ra­
tionale is predicated on the belief that suppressing evidence from illegal arrests will prevent 
police misconduct, not judicial misconduct. The Supreme Court has noted that it is inap­
propriate to apply the deterrence rationale to judicial acts. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 916 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather 
than to punish the errors of judges.... Most important[ly], we discern no basis ... for 
believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant 
deterrent effect on the issuing judge."); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 179,519 A.2d 
820, 868 (1987) (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If a police officer 
acting in an objectively reasonable manner secures a warrant from a judge and in good faith 
believes he has complied with constitutional requirements, what more can we ~xpect of 
him?"). As a result, it is illogical to use the exclusionary rule to deter law officers when 
they are acting under judicial direction (as in the case of a warrant) inasmuch as the pri­
mary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter the police, not the judiciary. Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, c.J., concurring) ("Once the warrant issues, 
there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law."). 
108. Amador-Gonzalez, 834 F.2d at 1186. 
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sent expressed apprehension about the likely results of applying the 
objective test strictly: 
By holding the arrest in Causey constitutional, the majority opinion 
establishes a new rule that makes the whole more than the sum of 
its parts: the police can take two bases for arrest, each constitution­
ally insufficient-an unreasonable and arbitrary execution of a war­
rant and a suspicion amounting to less than probable cause-and 
add them together as a basis for a constitutionally acceptable 
arrest. 109 
The dissent also feared that allowing the police to use pretextual 
tactics could result in routine abuse of constitutional rightS. IIO Any 
minor warrant would serve as an excuse for avoiding the fourth 
amendment restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. I I I As 
Judge Rubin said: "Police who desire to arrest an individual without 
probable cause may merely leaf through the files or tum to the com­
puter to determine whether they can ... arrest a suspect."1l2 The 
dissent concluded that "many millions will be exposed to pretextual 
arrest by virtue of the majority opinion" because of failure to pay 
parking tickets. 113 
The dissent claimed that the objective facts "mandate the conclu­
sion that the arrest was but a means to take Causey into custody in 
order to question him about an offense other than the one for which he 
was arrested."114 According to the dissent, the objective facts of the 
case demonstrated the existence of an improper motive for the 
arrest. I IS In addition, the simple fact that the arresting officers devi­
ated from standard departmental procedures indicated that they were 
not acting in good faith.116 
The dissent acknowledged that the Scott objective standard was 
controlling,117 but applied the test in a different way from the major­
ity. The dissent believed Causey's arrest was illegal because the arrest­
ing officers lacked an objectively valid reason to arrest him in the first 
place. I IS Because the facts indicated that the police could not have 
109. Id. at 1188-89 (Rubin, J., dissenting). 

llO. Id. at ll89-90. 

lli. Id. at 1190. 





114. Id. at 1186. 

llS. Id. at 1187-88. 

ll6. Id. at ll88. 

117. Id. at ll87. 
118. Id. at 1188. 
120 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:105 
had a legal motive to conduct the arrest, the dissent inferred that the 
police acted with an illegal motive. 119 Citing the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals for support, the court reasoned that the Scott test is 
"an examination of what a reasonable officer would do. When, as 
here, a reasonable officer would not have made the seizure of the sus­
pect's person absent an invalid purpose, the arrest must be condemned 
as pretextual." 120 In essence, the dissent contended that the absence of 
a legitimate motive can be demonstrated objectively by examining the 
circumstances known to the arresting officers. If no persuasive reason 
for making the arrest is found, the courts may infer an invalid motive 
and find the arrest pretextualPI 
The dissent also noted the unusual circumstances of the arrest. 
According to Judge Rubin, the Supreme Court has upheld searches as 
long as there is no evidence of "bad faith" on the part of the arresting 
officers.122 The dissent stated that bad faith can be demonstrated if the 
officers depart from standard procedures in conducting the arrest. 123 
"When standard practices, not themselves unlawful, are followed, the 
police are acting in a fashion that is reasonable, objectively viewed, 
even if they have an ulterior motive. Here the police were clearly not 
following standard procedures. And they were not acting in good 
faith-objective or subjective."124 In the dissent's view, "[t]heir devia­
tion from their usual practice without just cause made their conduct 
arbitrary."125 
III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE ApPROACHES 
The majority of courts apply the strict objective test for three rea­
sons. First, the strict objective test is based solely on an analysis of 
conduct and is therefore more consistent with the Supreme Court's 
language in Scott. 126 Second, the strict objective test is easier to apply 
than the SUbjective test because it avoids "a costly and time-consuming 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 1187 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709·11 (11th Cir. 
1986». Judge Rubin also quoted the Johnson court: "If a reasonable officer would not 
have made the arrest absent illegitimate motive, then the resulting search or inventory ... 
is unlawful." Id. (quoting Johnson, 815 F.2d at 315). 
121. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1186-89. 
122. Id. at 1187 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Cady 
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973». 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. The dissent concluded that "the police activity would not have been under­
taken but for the" improper motive, and therefore was illegal. Id. 
126. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137·38. 
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expedition into the state of mind of the law enforcement officers."127 
Lastly, Scott makes it clear that the alternative motive-based tests are 
theoretically indefensible. 128 For example, the exclusionary rule is in­
voked when an arrest is found to be unconstitutional. An arrest is 
unconstitutional only if the arresting officer violates some constitu­
tional requirement. According to Scott, bad motives do not violate the 
fourth amendment. 129 Bad motives, therefore, do not make an arrest 
unconstitutional. 130 As Justice Rehnquist observed in Scott, the fact 
that the officer lacks the proper motivation "does not invalidate the 
action taken."131 The theoretical weakness of sUbjective tests is that 
they examine motives, and, after Scott, motives do not determine the 
validity of an arrest. Therefore, the subjective test is focused on a fac­
tor that is not relevant to the question before the court. As one court 
explained: "An officer's underlying intent or motivation is irrelevant 
to the judicial inquiry."132 
The objective approach, however, also has several weaknesses. As 
the Causey I court pointed out, a strict application of the objective test 
allows law enforcement officers to use any trivial excuse, such as a 
traffic violation, as a means of arresting and interrogating a suspect for 
a crime for which probable cause does not exist. 133 As one judge ex­
127. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 221-22, 463 A.2d 320,326-27 (1983). TheBroz­
zese court observed that intent-based standards require the courts to engage in expensive 
and unnecessary examination of the psychology of individual officers. Id. In addition, the 
court noted that individuals may have several motives for a given action, further hindering 
the application of any subjective test. Id. Lastly, the court stated that the precedential 
value of such decisions would be limited because each case would be as unique as the 
intentions of the arresting officers themselves. Id. See United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 
846 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]he difficulty of applying a subjective standard would be 
monumental. "). 
128. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136-38. 
129. Id. at 136. See also State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 
(1987) ("[T]he constitutionality of the officer's action is not undermined by the officer's 
reasons. "). 
130. See People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 
(1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that when police officers do no more 
than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so 
are irrelevant and not subject to inquiry, and the results of their investigations are not to be 
suppressed.") (citing United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1935 (1989». See also United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1987) 
("As Scott plainly states, the unchallenged premises that the deputies had probable cause to 
and could lawfully arrest [the suspect] ... render irrelevant any inquiry into the deputies' 
... alleged ulterior motivation."); Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987). 
131. Scott, 436 U.S. at 138. 
132. State V. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (1987). 
133. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1186-89 (strict objective test allows law enforcement 
officers to "find some reasons to arrest a suspect for whose arrest they otherwise lack prob­
able cause."); United States V. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
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pressed it, the objective standard "converts an arrest warrant for any 
offense, no matter how minor or unrelated, into a skeleton key for 
every suspect's home."134 In addition, the strict objective test "virtu­
ally eliminates the possibility of ever proving a pretextual arresC'13S 
To prove that an arrest is a pretext under the strict objective test, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that there is absolutely no valid basis for the 
arrest. Yet, with a pretextual arrest, there will always be at least one 
valid reason. A pretextual arrest is, by definition, made up of two 
different charges: the serious charge for which the officers lack prob­
able cause and the trivial, but valid, charge being used as a pretext. 
Because the objective test will uphold an arrest if there is one legiti­
mate charge and a pretextual arrest always has one legitimate charge, 
the objective test will uphold all arrests,136 
To avoid the problems associated with the strict objective test, 
some judges use a modified approach similar to Judge Rubin's Causey 
I standard. 137 This approach limits judges to evaluating objective evi­
dence only, but also allows them to use such evidence to infer motive. 
Using the language of the objective test, this approach examines mo­
tives like the subjective test. But, it falls prey to the same weaknesses 
as the subjective approach because, as Scott made clear, motives are 
not relevant to the question of whether an arrest is acceptable under 
the fourth amendment.138 The modified objective test also punishes 
police officers who stay within the letter of the law. With the modified 
approach, an officer who conscientiously obeys the law can find the 
evidence from his arrests suppressed if a court decides that he acted 
with bad motive. 139 Lastly, as with the old subjective test, the modi­
fied objective test requires the court to engage in the unreliable process 
134. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 252, 463 A.2d at 343 (1983) (Pollock, J., dissenting). 
135. United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
136. Id. at 417. As the court stated in Keller: 
If every arrest were judged by an objective standard and upheld if there was a 
valid basis for the arrest, then there could never be a pretextual arrest. The con­
cept assumes that there is a basis for the arrest, but that the arrest is made for the 
purpose of conducting a search for which there would not otherwise be a 
justification. 
Id. See United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 182 n.l (5th Cir. 1988) (Causey "validated 
so-called pretextual arrest warrants."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1742 (1989). 
137. United States V. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); State V. Nerse­
sian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316-17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); United States v. 
Johnson, 815 F.2d 309,315 (5th Cir. 1982). 
138. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136-38. For a discussion of Scott, see supra notes 29-39 and 
accompanying text. 
139. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 222, 463 A.2d at 326-27 ("Delving into the ... motives of 
policemen penalizes officers who outwardly behave in a constitutionally appropriate 
way."). 
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of examining the thoughts of the arresting officers. l40 
Concerned with the deficiencies of the subjective and objective 
approaches, Professors Wayne LaFave and John Burkhoff have ad­
vanced their own alternatives. Section A of Part III discusses these 
alternatives. Section B of Part III proposes a new standard suggested 
by a New Jersey case. This new approach has two steps. The first step 
is an application of the strict objective standard. 141 The second step 
balances the cost of suppressing valuable evidence against the cost to 
the judicial system of tolerating police misconduct. 142 
A. Two Academic Alternatives to the Strict Objective Standard 
1. Wayne LaFave: The "Standard Procedures" Test 
Under Professor Wayne LaFave's test, if a given arrest is contrary 
to standard police practice, then the arrest is objectively arbitrary and 
unconstitutional. 143 The basis of Professor LaFave's test is the notion 
that the fourth amendment is primarily concerned with unreasonable 
searches and seizures. l44 A search is unreasonable if it is arbitrary. If 
the actions of the law enforcement officers are contrary to normal pro­
cedure, the arrest is arbitrary and a violation of the fourth 
amendment. 145 
This test has the virtue of being easy to apply. Under the LaFave 
approach, a judge only has to decide what constitutes normal law en­
forcement practices and then determine whether the arresting officers 
deviated from it. For example, in Causey, as well 'as in Taglavore 146 
and Cavallino,147 police from one department, contrary to normal pro­
cedure, executed warrants normally entrusted to an entirely different 
140. Id. For a discussion of Bruzzese, see infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text. 
141. For a discussion of the proposed test, see infra notes 167-99. 
142. For a discussion of the second step to the proposed test, see infra notes 183-99. 
143. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 90-97. 
144. Judge Rubin cited Professor LaFave's test in Causey 1,818 F.2d at 358, and in 
Causey II, 834 F.2d 1187-88. LaFave has been cited in several cases. See, e.g., United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 
n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). 
145. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 96. Professor LaFave recommends 
the "more widespread application of the requirement utilized by the Supreme Court in 
South Dakota v. Opperman, namely, that the fourth amendment activity 'was carried out in 
accordance with standard procedures in the local police department.''' Id. (citing South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976». 
146. 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of Taglavore, see supra notes 20­
26 and accompanying text. 
147. 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Cavallino, see supra notes 
79-81 and accompanying text. 
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department. 148 Because this behavior was a deviation from the 
norm,149 courts applying the LaFave standard would find these arrests 
invalid. LaFave also argues that his approach encourages police de­
partments to define their departmental regulations carefully and 
responsibly. 150 
Several courts and commentators, however, have criticized the 
LaFave test. For example, in State v. Bruzzese, 151 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court rejected the LaFave test because the court believed 
that it discourages police initiative. 152 In addition, academic sources 
have criticized the test on theoretical grounds. 153 One criticism is that 
LaFave's use of police regulations to determine the validity of an 
arrest is applying a non-constitutional test to solve a constitutional 
problem. 154 The constitutional question raised by the fourth amend­
ment is whether an arrest is arbitrary or unreasonable, not whether it 
is within police regulations. The LaFave standard is based on an anal­
ysis of "normal police procedure," and police procedure is not, in it­
self, relevant to the question of the constitutional validity of an arrest. 
Additionally, there are difficulties in Professor LaFave's assump­
148. Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 264. In Taglavore, the arresting officers were from the 
vice squad yet the warrant was of the type normally written by traffic officers. Id. 
149. Anderson v. State, 444 P.2d 239, 240-41 (Okla. Crim. 1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1017 (1969). 	The court stated: 
The only. evidence that causes the Court alarm in this regard was the fact that a 
Federal Narcotics Agent was with the arresting officer, and they were looking for 
a similar car. It always creates suspicion in the Court's mind when a Federal Agent 
is with a City Officer in making an arrest for a traffic violation .... 
Id. 
ISO. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 90-97. Note that Professor LaFave's 
approach is essentially objective. It is based on an examination of the conduct of the arrest­
ing officers, not their intent. Professor LaFave is generally supportive of the Scott objective 
approach and is critical of those courts that still seek to invoke the subjective standard. 
151. 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983). 
152. Id. at 228, 463 A.2d at 330. The Bruzzese court stated: 

We do not endorse the rule that a search shall be deemed unreasonable merely 

because a police officer deviates from his department's standard operating proce­

dure. This theory is espoused by Professor LaFave, in his Search and Seizure 
treatise . . .. The adoption of such a rule would discourage police officers from 
thinking and from exercising initiative .... It is impossible for a police depart­
ment to envision and to develop standard operating procedures for all such situa­
tions .... To hold that a policeman's conduct is unreasonable because it deviates 
from standard procedure would penalize the best officers and discourage imagina­
tive police ... work. 
Id. 	 See Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 108-09. 
153. Burkhoff. supra note 17, at. 104-11. See Note, Addressing the Pretext Arrest 
Problem: The Role ofSubjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amendment Viola­
tions, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 256 (1983). 
154. Id. 
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tion that all deviations from departmental regulations are prima facie 
evidence of a pretextual arrest. There are many reasons to deviate 
from any standard set of rules, and not all are illegal. 155 For example, 
the police may deviate from the rules in a specific arrest because it is 
physically safer to do so. If the normal procedure is to approach the 
suspect's front door, but the suspect in a particular case is known to 
shoot at officers, it may be reasonable to try a different method. The 
fact that police deviate from their normal routine does not mean that 
such deviation is improper and certainly does not mean that the devia­
tion violates the fourth amendment. As a result, the LaFave approach 
is overinclusive. 
At the same time, the LaFave approach is underinclusive. Police 
observance of standard procedures does not alone guarantee protec­
tion of a suspect's rights. Law enforcement actions may be within the 
normal scope of police authority yet still result in a violation of a sus­
pect's constitutional rights. For example, in certain circumstances, it 
may be normal police procedure to carry out a body search of a sus­
pect. This procedure, while within the authority of the arresting of­
ficers, can violate the fourth amendment if carried out in an arbitrary 
or Improper manner. 
Applying the LaFave standard to the facts of Causey would prob­
ably result in the exclusion of the confession. 156 Judge Rubin's dissent 
in Causey II observed that the actions of the arresting officers were 
"absolutely without precedent in the Baton Rouge police force."157 
Because the officers' conduct was outside of normal police procedure, 
the LaFave test would identify it as invalid and would trigger the ex­
clusionary rule. 
2. John Burkhoff: The Limited Subjective Approach 
Professor Burkhoff proposes a limited SUbjective standard. 15s 
The Burkhoff test, like the subjective test and the newer modified ob­
jective test, involves investigating the motives of law enforcement of­
ficers. If it appears that the arresting officer acted with dual motives, 
one motive legally sufficient and the other pretextual and illegal, Pro­
fessor Burkhoff would admit the evidence because the legally sufficient 
motive, by itself, adequately justifies the arrest. 159 Professor Burkhoff 
155. Burkhoff, supra note 17, at lOS. See Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 22S, 363 N.E.2d at 
370. 
156. SIS F.2d at 35S n.l3. 
157. Causey II, S34 F.2d at IIS7. 

ISS. See Burkhoff, supra note 17, at SI, 115. 

159. Id. at 9S-101. 
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suggests that in these circumstances the bad motive is "latent" and not 
acted upon. l60 According to Professor Burkhoff, a. bad motive, not 
acted on, is "constitutionally irrelevant."161 For Professor Burkhoff, 
an arrest violates the fourth amendment only if the officer is acting 
solely on an improper motive. 162 
Commentators have identified several difficulties with the 
Burkhoff approach. One major weakness is the practical problem of 
determining the "true" motivation of the police. '63 In State v. Bruz­
zese, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted: 
Since motives are seldom apparent or vocalized, there is little relia­
ble evidence of them. Even where motives are evident, the analysis 
may still pose problems. Complex creatures that they are, humans 
usually have several motives.. A judge cannot and should not be 
required to weigh the motives to determine which one guided the 
officer's behavior. . . . A further weakness of the SUbjective ap­
proach is that it is neither reliable nor predictable. Appellate courts 
with views of human psychology different from those of the trial 
court would no doubt be tempted to second-guess the latter's assess­
ment of the searching policeman's "true" intentions. l64 
Additionally, the Burkhoff test may encourage dishonesty. For 
example, under the Burkhoff approach, if the arresting officers have at 
least one valid motive for making an arrest, any illegitimate motives 
are assumed to be latent, and evidence from their search is admissible. 
Application of the Burkhoff test may encourage the arresting officers 
to invent "valid" motives for their actions, perhaps after the fact.165 
In addition, the Burkhoff test contradicts the Scott Court's conclusion 
that the thoughts of arresting officers do not determine the constitu­
tionality of their conduct. 166 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 99. 
162. Id. at 100-03. See Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 297, 523 N.E.2d at 1040. 
163. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 221,463 A.2d at 326. 
164. Id. 
165. See United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). The Arra 
court noted "the difficulty of administering a standard which turns upon motivation." Id. 
The Arra court cited Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 437 (1974), and stated that "motivation is a self-generating phenomenon. As 
law enforcement personnel learn that a particular motivation is improper because it will 
render an otherwise valid search invalid, they may not have difficulty convincing them­
selves that their conduct was prompted not by the improper reason but by the proper 
one.... " Arra, 630 F.2d at 845 n.12. 
166. Scott, 436 U.S. at 132-36. See United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). Professor 
Burkhoff's interpretation of Scott is different from that of other authorities. Burkhoff does 
127 1990] PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
There is another practical difficulty with Professor Burkhoff's 
method. For an arrest to be a pretext there must be two different 
charges-the minor pretext charge and the more serious one. The 
very nature of a pretextual arrest ensures that there is at least one 
legitimate, though pretextual, reason for the arrest. Professor 
Burkhoff's method accepts an arrest if there is one valid reason sup­
porting it. Because pretextual arrests invariably involve one valid 
charge, the Burkhoff approach will uphold most pretextual arrests. 
Applying the Burkhoff test to the facts of Causey would likely 
result in admission of the defendant's confession. The default warrant 
was valid, and the arresting officers could simply point to it as the 
valid reason for their actions. Even if the court were to determine that 
the officers also entertained improper motives, these would be classi­
fied as "latent" under the Burkhoff analysis. 
Because of the weaknesses in Professor Burkhoff's standard, as 
well as the weaknesses noted previously in Professor LaFave's method 
and in the SUbjective and objective tests, a different approach is 
needed. 
3. The Proposed Two-Step Standard 
A New Jersey case suggests another variation on the strict objec­
tive test that opens the possibility of reconciling the concerns of advo­
cates of both the subjective and objective approaches. In State v. 
Bruzzese,167 'police arrested a burglary suspect on an old unrelated 
warrant. 168 During the arrest, police seized evidence implicating the 
suspect in the burglary. The trial court suppressed the evidence. 169 
not believe Scott advocates a purely objective test for all fourth amendment situations. He 
believes that the Scott Court admitted the evidence because, although the police had an 
improper motive, it was not acted on. He reads the Court's finding that the wiretaps were 
objectively reasonable as an implicit determination that the police's illegal intentions had 
no effect on the eventual actions. Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 83-84. 
167. 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). 
168. Id. at 213-14, 463 A.2d at 322. The defendant was a suspect because the police 
were aware that he had been in the area of the crime and had made comments to his friends 
that he wanted to "get even" with his former employer for firing him. Id. Local police ran 
a check on his criminal record and found an old arrest warrant. Id. Interestingly, at trial it 
was determined that the police were unsure of the warrant's purpose. The court noted that 
at no point during the entire case was anyone sure for what charge the defendant was 
actually arrested. Id. at 245, 463 A.2d at 339. Four policemen used the warrant to make 
an arrest and carry out a search. The defendant alleged that, although the "seizure was 
objectively reasonable, it was unconstitutional because the ... arrest warrant served as a 
mere pretext for the search of the defendant's horne." Id. at 219, 463 A.2d at 325. The 
trial court held that the arrest was a pretext and suppressed the evidence. Id. 
. 169. Id. at 215-16, 463 A.2d at 322-23. 
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The appellate division affirmed 170 and, using a subjective test, con­
cluded that the arrest was a pretext. l7l 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate court cit­
ing the Scott objective test.172 Judge Garibaldi commented: 
We hold that the proper inquiry for determining the constitutional­
ity of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law en­
forcement officer who undertook the search was objectively 
reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or in­
tent. We emphasize that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unrea­
sonable actions, not improper thoughts. In determining whether a 
police officer's actions are constitutional, we do not rely on the of­
ficer's own sUbjective appraisal, but on an objective evaluation by a 
neutral judicial authority.173 
The Bruzzese court criticized the sUbjective standard,174 but also 
acknowledged that the objective test has potential for abuse. The 
court applied two limitations to the objective test to reduce this poten­
tial. The first, and more important for the Bruzzese court, is that the 
officer's conduct must be reasonable. "The requirement of reasonable­
ness is not one without teeth."175 The Bruzzese court referred only 
briefly to its second limitatiqn on the objective test. While emphasiz­
ing the reasonableness requirement, the court cited an earlier decision 
that held that, if a search is objectively valid, " 'the existence of other 
defects that do not . . . impugn the integrity of the judicial process 
170. Id. The appellate division used a subjective test observing that "the intent of 
the police officers may be determinative of the validity of their arrests." Bruzzese, 187 N.J. 
Super. at 443, 455 A.2d at 497. 
171. Bruzzese, 187 N.J. Super. 446, 455 A.2d at 493. 
172. Id. at 216-23, 463 A.2d at 323-27. 
173. Id. at 219-20, 463 A.2d at 325. The dissent argued that Scott, which involved 
only wiretaps, may not apply to actual invasions of the horne. The dissent voiced the con­
cern that the objective test, if applied woodenly, results in injustice and observed that the 
test "converts an arrest warrant for any offense, no matter how minor or unrelated, into a 
skeleton key for every suspect's horne." Id. at 252, 463 A.2d at 343. 
174. Id. at 221, 463 A.2d at 326. The Bruzzese court criticized the SUbjective stan­
dard for being costly and impractical. The court stated that "[w]ere the Court to adopt the 
defendant's SUbjective rule, practically every search-and-seizure case would require the 
court to engage in a costly and time-consuming expedition into' the state of mind" of the 
law enforcement officers. Id. The court also observed that motives are "seldom apparent 
or vocalized" and that there is usually little practical evidence of them. Id. The Bruzzese 
court also decided that the result of the establishment of a subjective test would be that 
"each case would be as unique as the individual officer's thoughts. In short, the law would 
become as unfathomable as the policeman's motives themselves." Id. at 222, 463 A.2d at 
326-27. 
175. Id. at 226, 463 A.2d at 329. 
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should not be relied on to invalidate the search.' "176 This second lim­
itation on the objective test is based not on the need to deter police 
misconduct, but on the need to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is deter­
rence.177 To a point, the deterrence rationale works well with the ob­
jective test. 178 If the arresting officers act in a way that is obviously 
unreasonable, the objective test will identify that arrest as a violation 
of the fourth amendment, and the exclusionary rule will suppress the 
evidence. 
Reliance on the deterrence rationale as a justification for the ob­
jective test, however, sometimes prevents the objective test from pro­
tecting fourth amendment rights. 179 For example, if the purpose of 
the objective test is to deter illegal conduct, the objective test has no 
application in cases involving pretextual arrests because, in pretextual 
arrests cases, the officers' conduct is itselflegal. 18o As one court noted, 
"Since evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is sup­
pressed in order to deter unlawful actions by police officers, the exclu­
sionary rule need not be applied when officers act in a lawful manner, 
even if they possess additional motives."181 
However, as the Bruzzese decision shows, deterrence is not the 
176. Id. at 227, 463 A.2d at 329 (quoting State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152,459 A.2d 
1159, 1162 (1983)). 
177. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,916,930-41 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary 
rule is designed to deter police misconduct."). See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Ex­
clusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 599 n.210 (1983) ("[T]he 'deterrence' rationale is of relatively 
recent vintage." Kamisar suggests that the rule should not be grounded on an empirical 
basis.); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusion­
ary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1374-75 (1981) ("[I]n almost every case after Linkletter con­
cerning the scope of the exclusionary rule, considerations of deterrence guided the 
Court."). 
178. It should be noted that some authorities question the effectiveness of the deter­
rence rationale. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,450-52 n.22 (1976) ("No empiri­
cal researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any 
assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect. "). 
179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,918 (1984) ("We have frequently ques­
tioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending of­
ficers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. "). 
180. Id. at 919. 
181. People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (1988). 
See Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-18 (1984) ("[E]ven assuming that the rule effectively deters 
some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a 
whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and 
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity."). 
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only rationale underlying the exclusionary rule. 182 The Supreme 
Court observed in Dunaway v. New York that "there is another consid­
eration-the imperative of judicial integrity"-which serves as an al­
ternative justification for the exclusionary rule. 183 In addition, in 
United States v. Payner,184 the Court said "[t]he Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule ... is applied in part 'to protect the integrity of the 
court, rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the 
defendant.' "185 
The original justification for the exclusionary rule probably was 
not deterrence. 186 In Weeks v. United States,187 the case that intro­
duced the exclusionary rll;le, the Supreme Court never referred to de­
terrence. On the contrary, the decision of the Supreme Court 
suggested that the Court was concerned with the effect of admitting 
the evidence on the reputation of the Court and the Constitution ­
"[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision 
a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution." 188 Only since Wolf v. Colorado,189 thirty-five years 
later, has the notion of deterrence been advanced as a justification for 
the exclusionary rule. 190 The deterrence rationale steadily gained ac­
ceptance until it became established as the primary reason for the ex­
clusionary rule. 
While it is true that "judicial integrity" is not currently used as an 
independent basis for excluding evidence, it can be used as a factor in 
balancing the costs and benefits of admitting evidence. 191 It is submit­
ted that in cases of pretextual arrests, the purpose of the fourth 
amendment is better served by applying the rationales of judicial integ­
182. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 223,463 A.2d 320, 329 (1983). 
183. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See Dunaway v. New York, 
442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (illegal evidence undermines court's integrity); Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) (discussing the basis of the exclusionary rule, "[t]hese considera­
tions of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become rather commonplace."). 
See also Schroeder, The Exclusionary Rule, 61 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1372-73 nn.72-76 (1981). 
184. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
185. Id. at 736 n.8. (quoting the dissent at 747). 
186. See Kamisar, supra note 177, at 598 n.21O. 
187. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
188. Id. at 394. Note that in Lefkowitz, the first Supreme Court case to ban evidence 
from pretextual arrests, the Court did not mention deterrence but focused instead on the 
need to protect individual liberties. 285 U.S. 452, 464-67 (1932). See Schroeder, supra note 
183, at 1371 n.70. See supra notes 16-17 for a discussion of Lefkowitz. 
189. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
190. See Kamisar, supra note· 177, at 598 n.21O. 
191. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974). 
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rity and deterrence together, rather than by relying on the deterrence 
rationale alone. 
For example, courts criticize the objective test as unjust because 
law enforcement officers succeed in "a scheme to evade the fourth 
amendment."192 The judicial integrity rationale provides a basis for 
excluding such evidence, not because of improper motives, but because 
the result of admitting the evidence calls into question the integrity of 
the judiciary. 
This note, therefore, proposes a two-step approach based on the 
strict objective test and the judicial integrity rationale. The first step 
would be the strict objective test. The strict objective test is simple to 
apply and effectively screens out any obviously illegal non-pretextual 
arrests. The second part of the proposed approach is to apply a sepa­
rate balancing test based on the judicial integrity doctrine. 193 The two 
factors to be balanced are the benefits to society from admitting the 
evidence and the costs to the integrity of the judicial system. Usually 
the benefits will include the fact that the evidence is very incriminating 
and will greatly assist the jury in the search for truth. 194 This phe­
nomenon m~y be especially true for voluntary confessions or perhaps 
physical evidence uncovered during a search. The costs, however, can 
be very important also. If the judicial system appears to condone cyni­
cally manipUlative actions on the part of law officers, the integrity of 
the entire legal system is threatened. In State v. Novembrino,195 the 
court noted: "'Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example ... 
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law. 
, "196 
This proposed test avoids the pitfalls associated with the modified 
objective approach because it does not depend on an analysis of police 
motives. The integrity of the judiciary is not directly threatened by 
192. United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 362 (1987). 
193. Balancing tests have been previously proposed for exclusionary rule questions. 
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (exclusionary rule questions must be 
"resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable evidence versus consti­
tutional rights. "); Burkhoff, supra note 153, at 268 (suggesting balancing "society's interest 
in seeing the officer make each arrest" against "the societal interest in preserving fourth 
amendment safeguards"). 
194. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) ("[A]ny apparent limitation 
upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon the 
basis of considerations which outweigh the general need for untrammeled discovery of 
competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice."). 
195. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987). 
196. Id. at 101, 519 A.2d at 823 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
485 (1938) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
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improper police thoughts. The integrity of the courts is threatened by 
facially valid police actions that appear to be deliberate manipulations 
of the law. For the purposes of the second phase, it is not important 
whether the police do or do not entertain improper motives. What is 
important is that the actions of law enforcement officers cannot appear 
to be so egregiously manipulative that the courts would be considered 
tacit partners in unseemly conduct were the evidence admitted. 
Applied to the facts of Causey, the first step of the proposed test 
would find the actions of the arresting officers objectively reasonable 
because the arrest was carried out under a valid warrant. The arrest, 
however, would probably not pass the second step for two reasons. 
First, the Baton Rouge police testified that they were uninterested in 
pursuing the minor charge. While this fact is unimportant to a strict 
objective analysis, it is very important to a judicial integrity analysis. 
If the courts permit law enforcement officers to use evidence from ar­
rests which they have publicly admitted were pretexts, the integrity of 
and respect for the judicial system are endangered. The second reason 
that the Causey arrest fails the proposed standard is because the of­
ficers' actions were a blatant attempt to avoid the restrictions of the 
Constitution. The Causey I court considered the arrest to be as repre­
hensible as an act of "brutality." 197 The Causey II dissent found that 
the actions of the police were "absolutely without precedent" in the 
jurisdiction. 198 Whether or not the officers were thinking illegal 
thoughts, their actions, taken as a whole, shocked members of the 
court. 199 The judicial sanction of actions of this type brings the courts 
into disrepute by association. 
CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Scott, the Supreme Court replaced the subjec­
tive test with an objective standard that permits evidence to be admit­
ted from an arrest if the actions of the law enforcement officers are 
facially legal. Several courts have criticized the objective test because 
it allows law enforcement officers to use minor infractions of the laws 
as a means of violating the fourth amendment. The Causey I court 
attempted to apply Scott in a way that avoided this result. This modi­
fication of the objective test has not gathered support in the courts 
197. 818 F.2d at 362-63. 
198. 834 F.2d at 1187. 
199. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J., 
concurring) (courts should suppress evidence from pretextual arrests that pass the objective 
test if "police action, taken as a totality, violates the fourth amendment"). 
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because it is contrary to the principles of the Scott decision and be­
cause it requires courts to condemn law enforcement conduct that is 
legal on its face. The proposals advanced by academic commentators 
have likewise been rejected because they are either impractical to ap­
ply or fail to prevent police misconduct. 
One solution to the unjust results of applying the objective test is 
to create a new standard based both on the need to deter improper law 
enforcement behavior and the need to preserve the reputation of the 
courts. This standard is not contrary to Scott but instead builds upon 
it. The proposed standard also does not require courts to engage in a 
vain search for the motives of arresting officers, but allows the courts 
to suppress evidence when the integrity of the judicial system is 
threatened by egregious misconduct. By including in the test criteria 
an analysis based upon judicial integrity, courts will simultaneously 
protect both the fourth amendment rights of suspects and society'S 
interest in the legitimacy of its legal system. 
Robert D. Snook 
